



The Restatement and Foreign Sovereign
Compulsion: A Plea for Due Process
In certain circumstances actions of individuals or entities compelled by foreign
governments may be protected from liability under the foreign sovereign com-
pulsion (FSC) doctrine. This relatively new doctrine has become more important
as transnational activity has increased. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Re-
lations Law devotes two sections to foreign sovereign compulsion.
§ 441. Foreign State Compulsion
(1) In general, a state may not require a person:
(a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of the state
of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by the
law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a national.
(2) In general, a state may require a person of foreign nationality:
(a) to do an act in that state even if it is prohibited by the law of the state
of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in that state even if it is required by the
law of the state of which he is a national.
§ 442. Requests for Disclosure: Law of the United States
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(1) (a) A court or agency in the United States, when authorized by statute
or rule of court, may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to
produce documents, objects, or other information relevant to an
action or investigation, even if the information or the person in
possession of the information is outside the United States.
(b) Failure to comply with an order to produce information may subject
the person to whom the order is directed to sanctions, including
finding of contempt, dismissal of a claim or defense, or default
judgment, or may lead to a determination that the facts to which the
order was addressed are as asserted by the opposing party.
(c) In deciding whether to issue an order directing production of infor-
mation located abroad, and in framing such an order, a court or agency
in the United States should take into account the importance to the
investigation or litigation of the documents or other information re-
quested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the infor-
mation originated in the United States; the availability of alternative
means of securing the information; and the extent to which noncom-
pliance with the request would undermine important interests of the
United States, or compliance with the request would undermine im-
portant interests of the state where the information is located.
(2) If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohib-
ited by a law, regulation, or order of a court or other authority of the state
in which the information or prospective witness is located, or of the state
of which a prospective witness is a national:
(a) a court or agency in the United States may require the person to
whom the order is directed to make a good faith effort to secure
permission from the foreign authorities to make the information
available;
(b) a court or agency should not ordinarily impose sanctions of con-
tempt, dismissal, or default on a party that has failed to comply with
the order for production, except in cases of deliberate concealment
or removal of information or of failure to make a good faith effort
in accordance with paragraph (a);
(c) a court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact
adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the order for
production, even if that party has made a good faith effort to secure
permission from the foreign authorities to make the information
available and that effort has been unsuccessful.
The foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine is used to avoid punishing conduct
compelled by a foreign government. The distinct doctrinal rationales supporting
FSC have caused considerable confusion. Foreign sovereign compulsion is based
on both international comity and due process/fairness components. The Restate-
ment focuses on the international law aspect of the doctrine and all but ignores
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the due process aspect. This incomplete perspective sometimes leads to a
blurring of the foreign sovereign compulsion and the act of state doctrine.' Even
though the Restatement contains separate sections on foreign sovereign compul-
sion and act of state, it does not adequately distinguish the two doctrines in the
respective comments and notes.
Both doctrines appear in the chapter entitled "Jurisdiction and the Law of
Other States." Although this classification is an improvement over the pre-
vious draft of the Restatement, it still misleads the reader into thinking that
foreign sovereign compulsion is essentially a jurisdictional question. While the
foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine is relevant in a jurisdictional analysis, it
also has been deemed to be an affirmative defense similar to duress 3 and force
majeure.4
The jurisdictional aspect of foreign sovereign compulsion is very similar to the
act of state doctrine. Both doctrines are concerned with international comity and
the political questions raised by one sovereign adjudicating the acts and/or laws
of another. These doctrines raise two questions: whether jurisdiction exists over
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443(l) (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] defines the act of state doctrine:
In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from examining the
validity of a taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory, or from
sitting in judgment on other acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state
within its own territory and applicable there.
For the origins of this doctrine, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964),
and Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
Both the act of state and the foreign sovereign compulsion [FSC] doctrines are very American
doctrines. The comity and political question component of both doctrines are established themes in
American law. FSC is even more uniquely American in that it weaves the strong U.S. commitment
and concern for fairness/due process into international considerations.
2. The previous draft had both doctrines ,in a chapter entitled "Conflicts of Jurisdiction."
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
3. The concept of duress is used in contract law to deny the existence of a valid contract or to
void a valid contract that was created under duress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1)
(1981) provides: "If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other
party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim."
The next section of the Restatement defines "improper threat" to include threat of criminal
prosecution, id. § 176(1)(b), and exchanges not made on fair terms and that are a use of power for
illegitimate ends, id. § 176(2)(c).
Underlying the Restatement's discussion of duress is the unfairness of forcing an individual to
honor a contract into which the individual was forced. The compulsion by a foreign sovereign has
many similarities with the concept of duress. The sovereign usually has more "bargaining power"
than the individual and often enforces its will with the threat of sanctions. If an individual is not held
legally liable for a contract formed under duress it seems equally reasonable that an individual cannot
be prosecuted for conduct compelled by a foreign state.
4. Force majeure describes a superior or irresistible force. Force majeure clauses in contracts are
used to protect individuals from causes that are out of their control and that could not have been
avoided by the exercise of due care.
The concept of force majeure promotes fairness by not holding an individual liable for unavoidable
events caused by a superior force. Similarly, foreign sovereign compulsion protects an individual
from conduct compelled (unavoidable) by a sovereign state (superior force).
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the acts of a foreign sovereign; and, if so, whether it should be exercised. This
is significantly different from a conflicts of law approach, which resolves conflicts
through the application of law-albeit possibly a hybrid of the conflicting
laws. 
The due process/fairness component of the foreign sovereign compulsion
doctrine is most clearly seen in the compulsion requirement. The courts have
devoted much time distinguishing "compulsion" from acquiescence and have
repeatedly decided true compulsion is required. 6 It is generally accepted in
American law that persons should not be held responsible for something they
were forced to do. 7 This classic pursuit of fairness requires close inspection of a
compulsion claim to ensure that this doctrine does not cloak illegal acts willfully
done. The injustice created by punishing a person caught between conflicting
laws of sovereign states was one of the reasons for the emergence of the foreign
sovereign compulsion doctrine.
I. Origins and Identity
The foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine has been discussed in antitrust and
discovery cases but it is not limited to those areas. 8 "Compulsion" was first
mentioned in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,9 an
antitrust case involving a government authorized monopoly purchase that
allegedly discriminated in vanadium purchases. The lower court, in holding for
Continental Ore, found that the defendants were acting as an arm of the Canadian
Government. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that even though the
defendant was acting with the permission of the Canadian Government, there
was no Canadian law compelling the discriminatory purchases. ' 0 Similarly, in
United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center" the court
reiterated the compulsion requirement. The court pointed out that the Swiss
5. The conflict of laws approach attempts to find the appropriate law to apply to foreign
individuals or events not located entirely within the territory of the court. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFuCT OF LAWS § 2 comment a (1971).
6. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (3d Cir. 1979); United States
v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600, at 77,456 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
7. This is seen in the doctrines of duress and undue influence in contracts, wills, and other
settings, force majeure in contract and commercial law, self-defense in criminal and tort law, and
generally throughout the law. See supra notes 3 and 4.
8. Many courts have avoided direct discussion of the doctrine. In Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1968), all the briefs submitted addressed the foreign sovereign
compulsion doctrine and yet the Supreme Court opinion resolved the case without discussing this
doctrine. Griffin, Zenith Leaves Major International Antitrust Questions Unanswered, 14 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 354 (1986).
9. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
10. Id. at 707.
11. 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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Government's approval of a watch cartel did not provide a defense in a U.S.
court. In dictum, the court said if, "the defendant's activities had been required
by Swiss law, this court could indeed do nothing. An American court would have
under such circumstances no right to condemn the governmental activity of
another sovereign nation."
1 2
In United States v. General Electric Co. 13 the defendants were accused of
antitrust violations by setting up a worldwide lamp cartel. In an attempt to
dismantle this cartel, the court was urged to eliminate a network of patent
cross-licensing arrangements and division of markets among the defendants. The
Netherlands Government protested the proposed relief as an infringement of
sovereignty. The court resolved this conflict by declaring that the Dutch company
would not be in contempt for any action or inaction done outside of the United
States. 14 "Compulsion" is never mentioned in the decision.
The concept of foreign sovereign compulsion was first used as a central
component of decision in Socigtg Internationale v. Rogers. 15 A discovery order
was entered for documents located in Switzerland. A good faith effort was made
by Socidtd General to comply with the order, but the Swiss Government
prevented their release pursuant to its nondisclosure laws. The lower court
acknowledged the good faith effort but held that compliance with the Swiss laws
did not excuse the failure to comply with the discovery order. Consequently,
Socidt6 General's complaint was dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed this
dismissal, saying: "[P]etitioner's failure to satisfy fully the requirements of
this production order was due to inability fostered neither by its own conduct
nor by circumstances within its control. It is hardly debatable that fear of
criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction." '1 6 The
doctrine is most explicitly reflected in the holding of Interamerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc. 17 where the plaintiff claimed that the defendants
12. Id. at 77,456.
13. 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
14. In section XI of the judgment that implemented this decision the court says: "[the defendant]
shall not be in contempt of this Judgment for doing anything outside of the United States which is
required or for not doing anything outside of the United States which is unlawful under Dutch law or
the law of any territory in which [the defendant] might be doing business." United States v. General
Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953); see also United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Ryan, J.). In British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., [1954] 3 All E.R. 88, Judge Danckwerts refers to art. IV, para. 3 of Judge Ryan's July 30,
1952, IC! judgment:
No provision of this judgment shall operate against [the defendant company] for action
taken in compliance with any law of the United States Government, or of any foreign
government or instrumentality thereof, to which [the defendant company] is at the
time being subject, and concerning matters of which, under the law of the United
States, such foreign government or instrumentality thereof has jurisdiction.
Id. at 92.
15. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
16. Id. at 211.
17. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) .
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violated antitrust laws by refusing to sell them oil. The defendants claimed that
their actions were compelled by the Venezuelan Government. The court held
that
[w]hen a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. Acts
of business become effectively acts of the sovereign. The Sherman Act does not confer
jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign sovereigns....
. . . Were compulsion not a defense, American firms abroad faced with a government
order would have to choose one country or the other in which to do business. The
Sherman Act does not go so far. 8
A more recent and comprehensive discussion of foreign sovereign compulsion
appears in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 19 in which the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant secured foreign patents by fraud. The defendant
claimed that the granting of a patent by a foreign government is the functional
equivalent of governmental approval of its patent right and is therefore not
subject to judicial review under the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine. The
court denied that this governmental approval rose to the level of compulsion,
thus the FSC defense failed. 20 In describing FSC, the court held:
One asserting the defense must establish that the foreign decree was basic and
fundamental to the alleged antitrust behavior and more than merely peripheral to the
overall illegal course of conduct....
Where governmental action rises no higher than mere approval, the compulsion
defense will not be recognized. It is necessary that the foreign law must have
coerced the defendant into violating American antitrust law .... The defense is not
available if the defendant could have legally refused to accede to the foreign power's
wishes.
21
II. Requirements and Limitations
Compulsion must be proven to claim foreign sovereign compulsion success-
fully. The party invoking the doctrine must have had no legal alternative and no
bad faith/scienter.
Much argument has occurred over what exactly constitutes compulsion. A
bright-line test would be too limiting. Compulsion is more than mere govern-
mental approval, 22 and more than a delegation of authority.23 True compulsion
requires more than mere favorable government action.
18. Id. at 1298.
19. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cit. 1979).
20. See Continental Ore v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
21. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293.
22. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
23. In Continental Ore, the Canadian Government delegated to the defendant, Union Carbide,
the control over the importation of vanadium oxide into Canada. Union Carbide's role as the
Canadian Government's agent was insufficient to invoke the FSC doctrine to shield antitrust
violations committed by Union Carbide pursuant to the authority delegated by the Canadian
Government. 370 U.S. at 704-05.
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One way of determining whether compulsion exists is by looking at the legal
obligations with respect to the activity and/or the sanctions for the nonperfor-
mance of the activity. 24 In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland there was
no legal requirement to form the cartel. The Swiss Government's approval of an
American antitrust violation was found not to be compulsion. 25 Furthermore, the
governmental order must also be a significant aspect of the illegal action and not
merely peripheral.26
Another facet of compulsion is the threat of tangible sanctions upon the party
being compelled. 27 These sanctions can be either civil, 28 economic, 29 crimi-
nal,3 ° or some substantial equivalent.31 In discovery cases the court may order
a party to produce documents located abroad. The court may decline to impose
sanctions, however, if the documents are not produced and the failure to do so
is caused by a foreign sovereign. 32 Foreign sovereign compulsion also requires
good faith by the party invoking the doctrine. If the compulsion was solicited by
the person compelled then FSC may not provide relief. Bad faith/scienter can be
manifested by lobbying a foreign government to pass a law or issue an order3 3 or
by purposely placing documents in a country with nondisclosure laws in an
attempt to remove the documents from the reach of U.S. discovery. 34 Discovery
cases additionally require a good faith effort to obtain the requested
24. The courts have also found that the threat of severe sanctions can create compulsion.
Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). Whether
a sanction is "severe" enough to create compulsion is a subjective test. Compulsion is easier to prove
if violation of the law or order resulted in a legal sanction (i.e., criminal or civil liability).
25. Watchmakers ofSwitz., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
26. If a foreign sovereign requires more harmonious interaction in a certain economic market,
FSC cannot be used to excuse the formation of a cartel in response to the governmental order. See
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
27. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); Interamerican Ref.
Corp., 307 F. Supp. at 1291.
28. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 897.
29. Interamerican Ref. Corp., 307 F. Supp. at 1291.
30. Socit6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
31. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 897.
32. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.
1977).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442(2)(c) allows for a negative inference to be drawn from the
nonproduction even when a good faith effort was made. This controversial provision gives the court
discretion to hold a person responsible for something completely beyond that person's control.
33. The courts are split on whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects lobbying foreign
governments for favorable legislation or governmental orders. Even if such lobbying is permitted, it
can be proof that the law or order was not compelled but rather actively sought by the party raising
FSC. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United
Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); California Motor Trans. Co. v.
Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
34. Socidt6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); see also O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota
Mercante Grancolombia, 830 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1987) (Colombian cargo reservation laws constituted
compulsion entitling the defendant to assert the FSC defense); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442 (2)(b).
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documents. 35 The good faith requirement finds its origins in the due process
component of FSC's doctrinal roots. The burden of proof of good faith lies with
the party invoking FSC.36
III. The Restatement's Approach to Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
Sections 441 and 442 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
attempt to define the scope of foreign sovereign compulsion. Section 441 deals
with the general doctrine while section 442 addresses foreign sovereign com-
pulsion in discovery cases. The rationale for dividing discussion of the doctrine
is that discovery cases are the source of most international jurisdictional tension
and have a flavor all their own. 37 This approach encourages confusion by creating
the misleading distinction that discovery cases require a different application of
FSC. The good faith element in section 442 denotes the due process component
of FSC. It would not be fair to punish a person who made a good faith effort to
produce the documents. The general section discussing FSC, section 441, does
not contain such a good faith component. This omission implies that this element
is unique to discovery cases, which is not the case. To determine whether
compulsion existed, a good faith inquiry is not only logical but essential.
Without such a good faith requirement, illegal actions can be hidden behind the
facade of compulsion and thereby defeat one of the primary purposes of the
doctrine, fairness. The confusion caused by this difference could have been
avoided by greater harmonization of their doctrinal and structural content.
The Restatement also seems unable to liberate itself from the discussion of
jurisdictional issues. While it is true that jurisdiction is an important aspect of the
doctrinal milieu from which foreign sovereign compulsion originated, the
Restatement's inability to move beyond that aspect limits the usefulness of its
description. 38
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442(2)(a).
36. The burden of proof with regard to good faith in the discovery case lies with the party to
whom the discovery order is directed. Id. § 442 (2)(a) comment h, reporters' note 8; see also Soci&t6
Internationale, 357 U.S. at 197.
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442, reporter's note 1.
38. Limits on a nation's jurisdiction to prescribe are discussed in § 403. Subsection I of this
section subjects the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe to a reasonableness test. Subsection 2 lists
factors that can be used to determine reasonableness. Subsection 3 provides a resolution mechanism
for a case of reasonable and conflicting exercises of jurisdiction that calls for a state to defer if the
other state's interest is clearly greater.
This section's reconciliation scheme sets the stage for an FSC situation. Exercising jurisdiction
over a person for conduct compelled by a foreign sovereign falls neatly into the unreasonableness
category defined by subsections I and 2.
Comment e to § 441 limits FSC to situations where the compelling state was reasonably exercising
its jurisdiction to prescribe. This limitation allows a state to decide the reasonableness of another
sovereign's laws.
Comment a to § 441 asserts that FSC arises under a § 403(3) conflict. This incorrectly implies that
if one state decides that the other state erroneously exercised its jurisdiction to prescribe that state's
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The comments and notes to section 441 discuss the requirement of severe
sanctions and the level of governmental involvement needed for FSC. 39 The
comment on the territorial aspect of FSC, 40 however, incorrectly implies that the
location of the sovereign and the compelled party is important in and of itself.
A law or order need not be within a sovereign's territory to be compelling. 4'
Geography does play a role in determining compulsion, but it is not as significant
as the comment implies.
Reporter's note 1 to section 441 comes close to acknowledging the due
process component when it cites United States v. General Electric, which says
that it is reasonable to provide "protection from being caught between the jaws
of this judgment and the operation of laws in foreign countries .. 42
Unfortunately, the Restatement does not express the fundamental nature of the
due process component. Therefore the discussion and description of compulsion
lack the unifying theme of fairness.
One of the major shortcomings of the Restatement's treatment of the
foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine is its failure to explicitly distinguish
FSC from the act of state doctrine. The Restatement should have clarified the
subtle but important distinctions. By treating FSC as a matter of jurisdictional
conflict and comity, the Restatement ignores the important due process
function performed by an FSC defense which elevates it above jurisdictional
turf wars.
IV. Department of Justice-Antitrust Cases
When the Department of Justice first addressed the foreign sovereign
compulsion doctrine it took a wary stance.43 Seeing this defense as a potential
excuse for a barrage of illegal activity and as a threat to executive control over
order would be less compelling upon the individual caught between two sovereigns. Compulsion
does not need to be morally or legally correct to exist.
39. Id. § 441 comment c discusses the severe sanction requirement and id. reporter's note 4 to
§ 441 discusses the degree of foreign government involvement (i.e., legislative act, licensing
structure, administrative decision, etc.).
40. Id. § 441 comment b.
41. This is best demonstrated by Interamerican Ref. Co. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970), where the Venezuelan Government ordered a corporation located in
New Jersey not to deal with another U.S. corporation. This case was mentioned in RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), § 441 reporter's note 5, as an exception to the general rule that the Reporter's claim is
demonstrated by United States v. Bechtel Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,429, 62,430 (N.
D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981). Here, Bechtel, an international corporation
based in the United States, was accused of refusing to deal with blacklisted persons in observance
of an Arab League boycott against persons doing business with Israel. The final consent decree
discussed what activity was not allowed within the U.S. and what activity was permitted abroad.
The case did not progress to the point where FSC needed to be invoked.
42. 115 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953).
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977); A.B.A.,
Section of Antitrust Law, Task Force Report: The Antitrust Guide for International Operations
Revisited, 54 ANTITRUST L. J. 839 (1985).
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political questions, it sought to ascribe territorial, legal, and commercial
limitations to the defense. First, the defense would not apply if the allegedly
illegal conduct took place entirely "within" the United States. This limitation,
if taken seriously, would decimate the doctrine almost entirely. Second, the
doctrine would not apply if the foreign sovereign was acting in its commercial
capacity, rather than its public capacity, when the compulsion occurred. Third,
the defense would not apply when the compulsion order was not lawful under the
foreign sovereign's own laws.
The final version of the Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guide-
lines for International Operations (Guidelines) recognizes an FSC defense to an
antitrust suit when two conditions have been met. First, the anticompetitive
conduct must be compelled by a foreign sovereign in circumstances "in which
a refusal to comply . . . would give rise to the imposition of significant penalties
or to the denial of specific substantial benefits." Second, the compelled conduct
must not have "plainly . . . occurred wholly or primarily in the United
States." 4
The Department concedes that "territorial tests are often difficult to apply' 
45
and offers as an example a situation in which it would not recognize a foreign
sovereign compulsion defense in which a foreign government required the U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign firm to organize a cartel in the United States to fix the
price at which products would be sold in the U.S. marketplace. This territorial
limitation is in accordance with the weight of opinion on the issue, 46 but it may
be inconsistent with the decision in Texaco Maracaibo.47
The Guidelines' approach to foreign sovereign compulsion is an improvement
over the approach taken in the draft Guidelines, which were revised after strong
criticism from the American Bar Association.48
44. U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
(CCH) Nov. 10, 1988).
45. Id.
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRo) § 441 comment b; see Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp.
1315, 1324-25 (D. Conn. 1977) (Canadian Government compulsion order may not shield a boycott
of a hockey league, implemented in the United States, of players under twenty years of age); United
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231, 263 (1980), appeal dismissed,
451 U.S. 901 (1981) ("We cannot agree with the proposition that if a foreign state compels an
American corporation to take actions in the United States which are intended to and do have severe
adverse consequences to free and fair trade in the United States, the American corporation is thereby
immunized from the full force of the laws of its own sovereign.").
47. 307 F. Supp. at 1291. Although the issue was not discussed directly, the defense was upheld
as to a refusal to sell oil to a particular company after the oil had been processed in a bonded refinery
in the United States.
48. The American Bar Association Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice
criticized the Department of Justice's draft Guidelines in a joint report to the ABA House of
Delegates. The House of Delegates adopted as ABA policy the report that is critical of the draft
Guidelines' unorthodox application of comity and act of state to limit FSC to a defense subject to
prosecutorial discretion. The report points out the conflicts between the draft Guidelines and the
existing case law and calls on the Department of Justice to
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V. Issues Not Resolved by Restatement
Since different cultures, governments and societies define "compulsion"
differently, a definition based on strictly western models may produce unfair
results. A foreign sovereign need not use formal legislation or administrative/
judicial orders to be compelling. 49 The fairness rationale for FSC would be
frustrated if an improperly narrow definition of compulsion were applied. The
ABA guidelines suggest that an FSC analysis focus on "the fact of compulsion
not its form." 50 If there is no clear definition of compulsion, however, FSC will
be difficult to apply.
Another difficult issue is the weight assigned to statements by foreign
sovereigns admitting compulsion. The Department of Justice argued in its
amicus brief in Matsushita Electric Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.: "Once a
foreign government presents a statement dealing with subjects within its area of
sovereign authority, however, American courts are obligated to accept that
statement at face value; the government's assertions concerning the existence
and meaning of its domestic law generally should be deemed 'conclusive.
While this is consistent with the act of state doctrine, it may in some cases
take account of the substantial authorities indicating that (a) it is the fact of the
compulsion, not its form, that should be the focus of the analysis; (b) inquiry into the
validity of the foreign state's activity may be limited by the act of state doctrine; (c)
the defense rests on fundamental fairness principles, and pragmatic judgments about
the preservation of foreign commerce, as well as comity.
23 INT'L LAW. 326 (1989).
49. A foreign sovereign may compel activity through informal means, e.g., private meetings,
unwritten policies, etc. Brief of the Governments of Australia, Canada, France, and the United
Kingdom as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitions at 6, 8, 10, 12, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1293 (1985).
The European Community has stated that it will not prosecute "export agreements imposed on
firms in nonmember countries by their governments .. " COMMISSION OF THE EuRoPEAN COMMUNl-
TIES, THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITON PoucY 27 (1974); accord Franco-Japanese Ball-Bearings
Agreement, 17 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 343) 19 (1974), reprinted in [1973-1975 New Dev. Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9697 (1974) (measures imposed on Japanese acts by Japanese
Government were outside scope of art. 85).
Further European recognition of such a defense may be found in art. 90(2) of the Treaty of Rome
(Treaty establishing the European Economic Community), done March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 1
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1958). This article might provide an exemption from the rules of
competition where application of those rules would obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of
particular tasks assigned to the enterprises.
The United Nations also appears to have accepted the principle of a sovereign compulsion defense
to charges of engaging in restrictive trade practices. See Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, 35 U.N. GAOR Annex
(Agenda Item 61(c)) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/35/6 (1980) (adopted by G.A. Res. 35/63, 35 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 48) U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981)) ("In order to ensure the fair and equitable
application of the Set of Principles and Rules, States ... should take due account of the extent to
which the conduct of enterprises ... is required by States.")
50. 23 Imr'L LAW. 326 (1989).
51. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 82-2004).
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undercut the good faith requirement of compulsion by allowing a defendant to
hide behind the statements of a foreign sovereign.
The courts have held that "true compulsion" requires more than governmental
involvement or acquiescence. In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.
v. United States,52 however, the Supreme Court recognized a state action defense
for conduct that is "authorized and actively supervised" by a state government.
53
In their amici brief in Matsushita the Governments of Australia, Canada, France,
and the United Kingdom contended that foreign sovereigns should receive at least
the same degree of deference given to state governments in the U.S. federal
system. 54
VI. Conclusion
The diverse doctrinal origins of foreign sovereign compulsion should not
become a barrier to its effective use. Instead of trying to fulfill all the
requirements and goals of the doctrines that produced it, the focus should be
limited to due process/fairness. Due process should protect persons from
punishment for conduct in which they were forced to engage. Unduly broad
interpretations and applications must be avoided. Compulsion must be more
clearly defined so that this doctrine can play an effective role in international
legal affairs.
52. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
53. Id. at 64-65.
54. Brief of the Governments of Australia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10, Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 574, reprinted in 24 I.L.M.
1293 (1985).
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